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State borders, symbolic boundaries and contested geographical space: citizenship 
struggles in Kosovo  
 
By Gëzim Krasniqi 
 
Introduction 
 
Space, both in its physical and symbolic definition, has traditionally been a central 
element of state and nation. Therefore, the concept of national citizenship merges space, 
nation and state through the dual capacity to include or exclude individuals. While 
looking at the process of symbolic modification of territory in Kosovo
1
 during the last 
twenty years, the paper argues that the symbolic changes and landscape modifications 
represent deliberate attempts of both Serb and Albanian elites for symbolic control over 
their perceived national territory and (re)definition of hierarchical citizenship.
2
 The paper 
looks at the construction and replacement of identity markers and symbols of territory – 
flags, sacred national sites, monuments, cultural objects, street names and signs – in 
Kosovo in the context of symbolic exclusion of individuals or particular groups from a 
political and geographic space. 
Appropriation and modification of territory and space can be part of the strategies 
of war and peace, mainly through the deliberate destruction and replacement of cultural 
objects and symbols of the ‘enemy’, as well as part of the struggle to define citizenship 
and citizenry in a polity. Therefore, the modification of territory becomes an aim of 
different conflicting parties because territory often holds deep symbolic meaning for 
people and represents “a vital constituent of the definition and identification of the group 
living within it” (Herb & Kaplan, 1999, p. 2). Whereas expansion of territory is the goal, 
wars commonly serve as the means, for apart from killings, deportation, population 
movements and ethno-demographic changes – to name but a few effects – wars also bring 
about appropriation and cultural purification of territory. This process of purification, 
mostly realised through the destruction of cultural objects and symbols of the ‘enemy’, is 
rarely accidental.  
Such was the case of the Yugoslav wars, which brought about large population 
movements, ethno-demographic engineering, “ethnic unmixing” (Brubaker, 1996, p. 
166), and the destruction of a huge number of cultural and religious sites in an attempt to 
attack and eradicate social institutions and cultural heritage, as well as to reshape space 
and modify territories in line with the political aims and territorial claims of the colliding 
                                                 
1
 Kosovo is a landlocked territory of 10,887 sq. km and has a population of around 1.8 million. In 1991 
Kosovo’s population was estimated to be just under 2 million, with Albanians comprising 82.2 per cent of 
the population and Serbs 9.9 per cent (See Judah, 2000, p. 313). Although the ethnic composition of 
Kosovo changed as a result of the war and migration, reliable and accurate data is still missing. In 2011, the 
Statistical Office of Kosovo organised the first census in two decades, but it was boycotted by Serbs living 
in the northern part of Kosovo. Nonetheless, the number of Serbs living in Kosovo is estimated to be 
around 130,000 or around 7 per cent. See http://esk.rks-gov.net/rekos2011/?cid=2,1.    
2
 According to Stephen Castles, the varying power (in political, military, economic and cultural terms) of 
states has led to the emergence of a similar hierarchy of rights and freedoms of their peoples, which he 
refers to as hierarchical citizenship. “Citizenship as a global norm implies the possession of set of civil, 
political and social rights, but again this legal principle masks a steep graduation in real rights and 
freedoms” (Castles 2005, p. 215). In many countries in the world, it is ethnic or religious minorities that 
experience de facto exclusion from political, economic and social participation. 
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parties. The systematic targeting of the heritage of the ‘other’ in the former Yugoslavia 
was widespread. The deliberate destruction of different national, cultural and religious 
symbols had a twofold purpose; first, it erased any identification markers that could act as 
proof of the longevity and historic presence of the opposing nation or ethnic group in a 
disputed territory, and second, it paved the way for reconstruction of the physical space to 
match the historical/cultural objectives of the opposing group. 
  
1. The myth of territory and national identity 
 
Territory is a crucial element in the creation of national identity. Thus, “territorially based 
identities are just some of the myriad identities possessed by people” (Herb & Kaplan, 
1999, p. 1). The notion of ‘homeland’ or ‘motherland’/’fatherland’ merges both a 
particular territory and group identity. So, fatherland, or “the holy land in which the 
people dwell, with its memories, heroic exploits, monuments, and the resting places of 
ancestors”  (Smith, 2003, p. ii) serves as one of the sacred sources and founding myths of 
modern nations. Since state and national identity are tied to territory and space (the latter 
are vital to national feeling), nationalists have for a long time used images of place “to 
link people to the land” (Herb, 1999, p. 17). Territory in itself means nothing more than 
mere geography; hence, what matters is the myth attached to a particular territory – the 
idea that a certain land is the place where the nation began and that, consequently, that 
territory is sacred (Schöpflin,
 
1997, pp. 28-29) - that strengthens attachment to a piece of 
land and reinforces group identities. Such myths of territory can help elites to mobilise 
mass support, strengthen authority and engender legitimacy, and above all, justify 
territorial claims over certain pieces of land. Once nationalism is at work, landscape is 
politicised and modified in harmony with the prevailing national narratives. This process 
is carried out mostly by symbolic appropriation and modification of a territory, usually 
leading to the “territorialization of memory” (Smith, 2003, p. 134) and the politicisation 
of space.  
In addition to myths of territory, symbols and rituals are crucial in the process of 
‘sacralisation of territory’. In the words of Schöpflin, “myth is the narrative, the set of 
ideas, whereas ritual is the acting out, the articulation of myth; symbols are the building 
blocks of myths and the acceptance or veneration of symbols is a significant aspect of 
ritual” (1997, p. 20). Everyday commemorations of national and historical days represent 
outstanding manifestations of the acting out of myths. 
 Various national elites have utilised myths and invoked them in order to mobilise 
their own people, exclude others, screen out certain memories, as well as to establish a 
sense of solidarity (Schöpflin,
 
1997, p. 22). By the same token, everything that 
symbolises and characterises territory – flags, maps, anniversaries, monuments, cultural 
objects – plays an immense role in reinforcing the myth of territory (Schöpflin 1997, p. 
29). The Serb myth of the “Battle of Kosovo” (Duijzings, 2003, pp. 176-202) represents 
such an example. In other words, an identity that is based on a territorial myth and which 
is closely associated with it, is, as Kaplan named it, a “spatial identity” (1999, p. 35). 
 
1.1. Space, politics and identity 
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Spatial identities are only one kind of identity that connect people. “The spatial identity 
of a national group is composed of land deemed essential to its security and vitality” 
(Herb & Kaplan, 1999, p. 3). According to Herb and Kaplan, this particular piece of land 
that is crucial to a national group, may consist of many parts: it may be the actual space, a 
particular terrain that defines the group, the locational context vis-à-vis other powers, the 
historic legacy of a particular area, or economic and military-strategic importance (ibid). 
Although landscapes in general have much in common, nevertheless, each nation 
treasures its own particular geographical features and elements; hence, cultural heritage 
and geographical traits are integral parts of the national identity (Lowenthal, 1994, p. 17). 
Häkli, on the other side, used the term “discursive landscape” (1999, p. 124) to emphasise 
various ways in which geography is involved in the evolution of national identities and to 
address the specific relation between national identity, culture and space.  
In reality, this kind of landscape is produced by a range of actions and activities 
taken by elites in order to erect and build new symbols and signs of material culture in a 
given territory through the process of territorialisation of memory and politicisation of 
space. In return, the process of reifying territory creates conditions for “spatial 
socialization” (Paasi cited in Herb, 1999, p. 17) as members of a given nation become 
socialised within a geographically bounded space – their homeland. In this way, the 
political attitudes and beliefs of people living in a certain territory are shaped by symbols 
found on it.  
As far as state space is concerned, Neil Brenner et al (2003, p. 7) identify three 
dimensions of it. The first is state space in the narrow sense. It refers to the state's 
distinctive form of spatiality, comprising both the changing organisation of state 
territoriality in the modern inter-state system and the evolving role of borders, 
boundaries, and frontiers. The second dimension - state space in the integral sense – 
refers to the specific ways and modes, both territorial and non-territorial, in which state 
institutions are mobilised strategically to regulate and reorganise social and economic 
relations. Finally, state space in the representational sense refers to competing spatial 
imaginaries that represent state and political spaces in different ways. In addition, these 
spatial imaginaries also represent an important source for political representation and the 
mobilisation of territory-, scale-, and place- specific forms of state intervention (ibid.). 
 
1.2. Symbols and other identity markers 
 
Symbols have an enormous potency in political processes and their instrumentalisation is 
bound up with conflicts and may even lead to wars. According to Schöpflin, “[t]he 
potency of symbols in the political process derives from the fact that they are vehicles for 
conceptualization” (1997, p. 28). With regard to the relationship between people and 
symbols, Cassirer and Langer argue that men live in a symbolic world created by them 
and that symbolic thinking is the fundamental function of human consciousness and 
constitutes the basis of any kind of human activity (cited in Mach, 1993, p. 22). Hence, 
symbols are essential identity markers. Territory, too, is conceptualised through symbols. 
Likewise, according to Cohen, social relationships develop through and are maintained 
by symbols; “We ‘see’ groups through their symbols” (cited in Mach, 1993, p. 39). This 
explains the fact why states aim at monopolisation of symbolic life and symbolic control 
over particular territories. 
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As already mentioned, myths and symbols are utilised by elites to build 
legitimacy and reinforce authority as well as control over people and territory. Mach 
argues that symbols are utilised precisely because of their role as vehicles that convey 
values (1993, p. 37). Everything that symbolises territory – flags, maps, anniversaries, 
houses, streets, squares, and cemeteries, religious cites etc., – is part of the symbolic 
world of a group of people and/or a nation. Even boundaries which people build to 
separate themselves from the others are of a symbolic nature (ibid, 20). Since territories 
are crucial elements in the development of national identity, everything that symbolises a 
territory serves as an identity marker. Thus, political projects of the national and state 
elites set up the ‘symbolic fabric’ that, by producing symbols, links “the self-
understanding of a people with a particular territory, concrete places, everyday practices 
and imagination” (Häkli, 1999, p. 130). This way, the emerging symbols in a particular 
territory serve to document the longevity of a nation’s life and to strengthen identity by 
linking it to a certain territory. Likewise, they serve as links between people and polities. 
Identity, territory and space are closely connected to each other. Mach argues that 
territory conceptualized as homeland is the main component of ethnic identity (cited in 
Duijzings, 2003, p. 62). A glorified and much-cherished territory and space is often used 
by political and national elites to transform and reinforce ethnic and national identities in 
line with nationalist projects and goals. So, symbolic appropriation and modification of 
the territory is essential in ‘proving’ one’s longevity in a particular territory and 
dominance over ‘the other’. Throughout the twentieth century, Serb and Albanian elites 
have engaged in a struggle for political domination in the hierarchy of citizenship, 
symbolic appropriation and modification of the territory and space of Kosovo. 
 
1.3. Citizenship, space and boundaries 
 
Space in general, and public space in particular, has historically been an important 
element for the emergence and development of citizenship. As Isin and Wood argue, “If 
we consider the spaces within which citizenship rights were developed, it is clear that 
they were centred in non-domestic and, in this way, public spaces. Or, to look at it from 
the reverse view, citizenship rights were mapped in congruence with access to public 
space” (1999, p. 78). Likewise, borders and boundaries are essential in the process of 
state and citizenship constitution. They are both physical and symbolic. Traditionally it is 
physical borders that determine the scope and size of a polity. In addition, they determine 
who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’. Nonetheless, a rigid view of citizenship that derives from its 
dual capacity to include insiders and exclude outsiders seems to have started being 
exchanged for a more flexible definition, one where state borders do not coincide with 
citizenry and symbolic boundaries. As far as the latter are concerned, they cut across both 
the would-be nation state and trans-border ethno-cultural communities.      
 Thus, even in those cases where states have put in place one tier and integrated 
citizenship regimes, symbolic boundaries emerge within the state and its public and urban 
space(s). According to Yuval-Davis (2003) bounded urban spaces play the role of a daily 
theatre for the performance of (struggles over) citizenship. This performance of political 
identity involves the intersection and (re)articulation of ethnic, class, and gender 
differences, as well as continuing struggles over the socio-institutional boundaries 
delimiting the exercise of citizenship. Therefore, different groups struggle over the 
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control of different spaces, thus leading to a process of spatial inclusion/exclusion, which 
is not necessarily related to the central state level of citizenship inclusion/exclusion. In 
other words, even in those cases when citizenship regimes are open and inclusive towards 
all the residents of that territory without discrimination over ethnicity, language or 
gender, exclusion can result from the continuing struggles over the socio-institutional, 
symbolic and special boundaries delimiting the rights to citizenship.  Therefore, urban 
space in particular serves as the arena for new modes of political action and for new 
forms of political identity. 
In what follows, the paper looks at the role of geography and space as a daily 
theatre in the process of continuous struggles over the socio-institutional, symbolic and 
special boundaries delimiting the rights to citizenship in the case of Kosovo.  
 
2. Wars and continuous modification of territory and space: the case of Kosovo 
 
Albanian and Serb elites have had overlapping historical claims to the territory of Kosovo 
for a long period of time, thus making Kosovo’s territory “[a] landscape whose 
ownership is disputed” (Brown, 1994, p. 796). As a consequence, in the last one hundred 
years the territory of Kosovo, a territory with disputed ownership, has been modified 
many times and has known major symbolical changes. As in other similar cases, Kosovo 
in certain historical moments, during or after wars, has experienced phases of “the 
appropriation and ‘cultural’ purification of the landscape, the destruction of churches and 
mosques, and the elimination of the cultural heritage of the ‘Other(s)’” (Duijzings, 2003, 
p. 37). During and after the annexation of Kosovo by Serbia in 1913 as a result of 
Serbia’s attempt to change the composition of the territory of Kosovo and establish full 
control over it, many old and traditional Albanian
3
 cultural objects and traditional houses 
called kulla (tower) were destroyed; many places were renamed with Slavic names. This 
kind of modification of territory represents a nationalist cleansing of space with the 
purpose of legitimising territorial claims.  
In the post Ottoman period, many Albanians and Muslims were expelled or killed 
and most of the visible traces of their culture were erased, so that “[t]he ‘reality’ of new 
landscape [becomes] powerful evidence for the rightfulness of territorial claims” (Herb, 
1999, p. 23) of Serbia. Nevertheless, the next step of the Serb government was to 
repopulate the destroyed and emptied areas with Serb and Montenegrin inhabitants. The 
first attempt was made in 1914 with the adoption of the ‘Law-decree on the settlement of 
the newly liberated areas’, followed by the decree on ‘preliminary measures for agrarian 
reform’ of February 1919, which aimed at offering many favours, advantages and 
incentives (including land and exception from taxes for an initial period) for Serbian and 
Montenegrin families willing to move to Kosovo (Malcolm, 1998, p. 279-280). Those 
new villages and neighbourhoods that were built were given “suitably uplifting names 
from Serbian mythology” (Malcolm, p. 281), such as Devet Jugovića (Nine Jugovićs – 
the nine brothers of the Jugović family that died in the Battle of Kosovo), General 
Janković (a commander of the Serb army in the First Balkan War), Srbica, etc. Adopting 
Mach’s terminology (1993, p. 196), it can be concluded that the reconstruction of historic 
                                                 
3
 By using the adjective ‘Albanian’ or ‘Serb’ to describe local populations, cultures or identity markers, I 
do not wish to suggest that they are monoliths. Rather, it refers to people, symbols and objects perceived as 
such.  
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places in the territory of Kosovo after the annexation by Serbia - a symbol of the 
continuation and rebirth of Serbs - was done at the expense of Albanian and pre-existing 
Ottoman historic symbols and cultural heritage.  
As far as formal citizenship of Albanians in the interwar Yugoslavia is concerned, 
their status was downgraded to that of a religious minority and apart from being generally 
treated as second-class citizens, various attempts were made by the state to facilitate their 
migration to Turkey (Rava, 2010; Krasniqi, 2010).
 
In the new state of the South Slavs, 
Albanians, together with other non-Slavic minorities occupied the bottom position in the 
hierarchical citizenship of the state.  
 However, the situation shifted somehow during World War II (WWII), when the 
biggest part of Kosovo and parts of Western Macedonia joined Albania, which was 
annexed by Italy in 1939. New Albanian symbols (symbols of the Kingdom of Albania) 
became visible in Kosovo. At this time, many Albanians in Kosovo sought “to seize the 
opportunity offered by the collapse of Yugoslavia to gain more power over their own 
territory and reverse the colonizing and Slavicising policies of the previous decades” 
(Malcolm, 1998, p. 296). As a result, many schools were opened, carrying the names of 
renowned Albanian historical figures, poets and intellectuals.  
 
2.1. ‘Brotherhood and unity’ and the socialist vision of territory  
 
At the end of WWII and after the communist takeover, Yugoslavia was constructed on 
the principles of federalism and self-determination of free and equal nations. Under the 
1946 Yugoslav Constitution Kosovo became an ‘autonomous region’ (oblast) - a lower 
status than that of an ‘autonomous province’ (pokrajina) given to Vojvodina - of the 
People’s Republic of Serbia, and Albanians were not defined as people (narod)4 but as a 
national minority (nacionalna manjina).
5
 In the early 1970s Kosovo became a ‘socialist 
autonomous province’ (SAP) and obtained its own constitution, parliament, government, 
central bank, constitutional court, as well as representation in the federal institutions 
independent from the Republic of Serbia and thus was a republic in everything but name. 
This implied that Kosovo’s institutions had the main say on a range of issues, such as 
political, social, economic and spatial planning. This meant a more balanced relationship 
between both Kosovo and Yugoslav authorities and Serbs and Albanians on many issues, 
including control of and access to space and territory in Kosovo. 
Regarding territorial and modification politics, a major wave of territorial and 
spatial modification occurred in Kosovo after the end of WWII. Though the post WWII 
changes reflected the socialist spirit in general, elements of national identity of the titular 
nations in Yugoslavia became omnipresent all around the country. These new changes 
were manifold and were done under the pretense of ‘modern urbanisation’. In the words 
of Andrew Herscher: 
 
Post WWII ‘urban modernization’ targeted other religious sites, along with other 
examples of pre-modern architectural heritage for destruction. In Kosova, urban 
                                                 
4
 The category of the people (narod) was initially assigned only to Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, 
Macedonians and later in 1971 to Bosnian Muslims, under the term “Muslims”. 
5
 In 1963 Yugoslavia dropped the term ‘national minority’ to substitute it with the politically less sensitive 
term narodnost. 
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modernization was more damaging to Islamic religious sites than to Orthodox 
ones, a result of both the Ottoman-era urban morphology of Kosovar cities and 
Orientalist ideology that posed Ottoman-era heritage as a product of a primitive 
pre-modern culture. To the slogan of “Destroy the old, build the new!”, brigades 
of ‘Popular Front’ volunteers in Kosova, as elsewhere in Yugoslavia, destroyed 
mosques as well as Ottoman-era bazaars and other buildings as part of modernist 
urban renewal projects in cities such as Prishtina, Peja and Prizren. The 
significance of targeted religious sites as ethnic symbols was less explicitly 
salient to the socialist state than their significance as symbols of the pre-
modernity the state was striving to overcome (2006, pp. 39-40). 
 
Such drastic changes imposed by the Yugoslav state and the newly emerging 
architecture “can be regarded as a symbolic structuring of territory, as a manifestation of 
the [new] cultural organization of the land, and of the process through which people 
expressed and communicated their [new Yugoslav] identity and transformed the natural 
land into cultural territory” (Mach, 1993, p. 198). Hence, the aim was to transform what 
remained from old traditional Albanian and Ottoman style architecture into new 
Yugoslav socialist cultural territory. 
On the other hand, in an attempt to territorialise the memory of the Battle of 
Kosovo
6
, in 1953 Serbian authorities decided to build a monument to the Kosovo heroes 
close to Sultan Murat's turbeh (Gazimestan turbeh). This practice of sacralisation of land 
was followed up by the practice of rituals of gathering people around the monument on 
the day of the Battle of Kosovo, June 28, 1389.  
 
                                                 
6
 The Battle of Kosovo (1389), fought at the ‘Field of the Blackbirds’ (now Kosovo Polje/ Fushë Kosovë) 
between the Balkan armies and the Ottoman forces, takes a central place in the modern Serbian nationalist 
discourse and narratives. For more see Duijzings (2003, pp.176-202). 
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Fig. 1. The Monument of the Battle of Kosovo Heroes in Gazimestan, close to Pristina  
(Source: Wikipedia) 
 
Such rituals serve to perpetuate the myth of the Battle of Kosovo, and of Kosovo 
in general as a sacred land, and thus represent what Durkheim called the elementary 
forms of the religious life (1964), meaning mechanisms by which a society maintains or 
establishes a sense of collective activity in periods of apparent dispersal, that is achieved 
by “the sacralization of particular places which derive their sacred quality less by what is 
in them, than by illuminating the solidarity of those who view them” (Brown, 1994, p. 
787). 
 During the period from 1945 until the abolition of the autonomy of Kosovo in 
1989, the cultural landscape of Kosovo, including the architecture, was impregnated with 
socialist aesthetics and the ideology of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ (Bratstvo i Jedinstvo). 
Narratives and discourse about partisans
7
 were omnipresent in this period, as expressed 
by symbols, signs, monuments, street and school names carrying the names of heroes of 
the anti-fascist war. The legend of Boro and Ramiz (a Montenegrin and an Albanian who 
died together fighting for the partisans in the WWII) after whom many schools, sports 
and cultural centres (including the main one in Pristina), and various other institutions 
                                                 
7
 Members of the antifascist and revolutionary movement in Yugoslavia during World War II. 
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were named, “was an especially important story to be told in Kosovo, where the story of 
their fraternal sacrifice would provide the normative framework for a new relationship 
between local Serbs and Albanians” (Kerenji, 2008, p. 118). Hence, the socialist spirit 
was to dominate the territory and space in Kosovo for almost half a century, until the late 
1980s when the situation deteriorated, first in Kosovo and then in the rest of Yugoslavia. 
 Thus, during socialism, the legal, political and social empowerment of Albanians 
in Yugoslavia in the 1970s created conditions for a more equal
8
 access to public space 
and symbolic representation. This led to a higher level of integration between all the 
groups in Kosovo in terms of sharing public spaces and other socially owned institutions. 
The principle of ‘equality of narodi and narodnosti’, which was central in the definition 
of citizenship, translated into an increasing level of equality in terms of access to public 
spaces and symbolic representations of peoples.  
 
2.2. 1990s: the period of total Serbian control and war 
 
Following the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and the fall of socialist 
Yugoslavia, discriminatory and repressive practices aimed at ethnic Albanians in Kosovo 
became common in the new state. From the outset of the creation of the new Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the new citizenship regime de facto downgraded the 
position of Albanians (from ‘nationality’ to ‘national minority’) and striped them of their 
basic political and legal entitlements (Krasniqi, 2010, p. 7; Rava, 2010, pp. 9-10). In 
reaction to these repressive measures, Albanians in Kosovo, under the leadership of the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), boycotted Serbian institutions in Kosovo and set 
up their own parallel system of education and health. In turn, this created a new harsh 
reality for the Albanian population and turned Kosovo into a segregated society.  
After 1989, when Serbia abolished Kosovo’s autonomous institutions, a new 
wave of territorial and spatial modification in Kosovo and Pristina was initiated by the 
Serbian regime. The cultural landscape changed too: a process of ‘Serbisation’ of the 
region began. All the schools were supposed to serve Serbs exclusively - especially 
secondary schools and university – while street names and other signs became 
exclusively Serbian. Many Albanian cultural institutions were closed down or destroyed. 
This wave of attacks on cultural sphere was an attempt to reduce both ‘socialism’ and 
‘Albanianism’. For example, in the mid 1990s, in the city of Gjakova (Serbian 
Đakovica), which had a 97 per cent Albanian population, all the Albanian street-names 
were changed into Serbian, commemorating heroes and saints; one of the main streets, 
which was called ‘The League of Prizren’ later was named ‘King Peter the Liberator’ 
(Malcolm, 1998, p. 352). New monuments of Serbian heroes were erected in squares, in 
front of public building etc, and churches were built. Serbian authorities started erecting a 
new Orthodox Cathedral even in the University Campus in Pristina, but due to the 
eruption of the conflict in 1998 it remained unfinished. Archives from libraries and 
                                                 
8
 Yet, for many Albanians, the fact that Albanians were a narodnost and Kosovo an autonomous province 
as opposed to the six south-Slavic narodi and republics respectively, was an indication of their lesser status 
in Yugoslavia.  
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institutions, as well as many materials from museums were taken to Serbia. Even the 
name of Kosovo was officially changed to ‘Kosovo and Metohija’9 or ‘Kosmet’.  
 
 
 
Fig.2. The unfinished Orthodox cathedral “Christ The Saviour” in the University Campus in 
Pristina 
 
The axe of division and separation fell on the education system as well. 
Kostovicova (2005) has analysed in detail the process of spatial separation between Serbs 
and Albanians in Kosovo in the 1990s and the way in which these spatial arrangements 
affected the symbolic coordinates of both communities. A mental map of separation was 
thus created through the education system. While focusing on the education system in 
Kosovo, Kostovicova illustrates the reconfiguration of national identity through the 
interplay between two different understandings of the space – space as a symbolic and 
physical resource. She argues that:  
 
In post-autonomy Kosovo, educational space became closely linked to political 
space. Therefore, nationalism had turned education into a battleground and 
created new spaces that became a source of new identity. The symbolic 
redefinition of homeland was a part of that identity (Kostovicova, 2005, p. 3). 
                                                 
9
 Metohija (meaning ‘monastic estates’) is the Serbian name for the south-western part of Kosovo, which in 
Albanian is called Rrafshi i Dukagjinit.  
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Things deteriorated further during the war, when hundreds of cultural objects, 
mainly religious ones, were destroyed during the fighting. The eruption of the armed 
conflict in Kosovo in early 1998 between the Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces 
and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) paved the way for the military intervention of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the territory of the FRY. In response 
to this, the FRY authorities carried out a large-scale action of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo 
which resulted in more than 850,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees being deported into 
neighbouring countries; hundreds of thousands of others became internally displaced 
persons (UNHCR, 1999). Apart from private Albanian houses, according to the Islamic 
Community of Kosovo, approximately 200 (of the more than 600 mosques in Kosovo) 
were damaged or destroyed during the 1998-1999 war, along with other Sufi lodges and 
Islamic schools (Medrese), archives and libraries (Herscher, 2006, p. 41). Likewise, the 
Museum of the League of Prizren, which is located in the Ottoman quarter of the historic 
town of Prizren, in the 1990s first had its exhibits taken away and was used as a hostel for 
Serbian refugees from Croatia (Malcolm, 1998, p. 352) and finally was burned and 
destroyed completely by Serbian forces on March 29, 1999. 
 Likewise, architecture, as “a symbolic form through which a community creates 
its identity” (Mach, 1993, p. 194) was targeted. Old symbols of Peja (Serbian Peč) and 
Gjakova – Old Turkish Bazaars (Çarshia) were burned too. In short, everything that 
could manifest the symbolic world of Albanians, their cultural organisation of the land 
and identity, was seriously endangered during the war. Undoubtedly, deliberate targeting 
of the Albanian cultural heritage in Kosovo was one of the main goals of the Serbian state 
in the 1998-1999 war. 
 
2.3. Changing faces: replacing Serbian identity markers and symbols in post-1999 
Kosovo 
 
Both Albanian and Serbian cultural objects were targeted in the years of conflict (1998-
99). The Serbian army and paramilitary forces destroyed the former during the conflict, 
whereas the latter were mainly attacked and destroyed by Albanian groups after the 
withdrawal of the Serbian machinery from Kosovo and establishment of the international 
presence in the country in June 1999, in a deliberate attempt to eradicate symbols of ‘the 
other’. According to estimates made by the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, 
approximately 140 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries have been damaged or 
destroyed since June 1999 (Herscher, 2006, p. 42). After 1999, everything that 
represented Serbian culture – churches, monasteries, houses, cemeteries, monuments – 
inspired hostility from many Albanians. As a result, many Serbian settlements
10
 were 
burned, churches attacked and destroyed, in what was considered as revenge by the 
Albanians for the crimes and destructions committed by the Serbian state in the earlier 
period. In addition to revenge, this campaign served as a means of Albanian nationalists 
to reconfigure space and territory in the post-war reality in Kosovo.  
                                                 
10
 The UNHCR estimated that the total number of non-Albanian refugees that left Kosovo after the 
international intervention in June 1999 is 200,000. For more detailed analysis of the number of refugees 
from Kosovo see UNHCR (2000; 2009) and ESI (2004). 
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 Meanwhile, at this period started what Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers have 
called, “construction of a Pan-Albanian master narrative in post-war Kosovo” (2006, p. 
513). At the centre of this narrative was the myth of the war heroes of the KLA – Kosovo 
Liberation Army (UÇK – Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës) and, especially, one of the 
founding commanders of the KLA, Adem Jashari, who died in early 1998 together with 
his extended family and some of his cousins under siege at his home while fighting with 
the Serbian forces. After the war, “social reproduction of the Jashari legend became 
ubiquitous, and is evident in the many schools, barracks, squares and streets all over 
Kosovo that are named after him…[and]…there are many representations of Adem 
Jashari as a brave warrior – in popular songs, postcards, calendars, medals, posters, 
copper plates, watches, notebooks and other souvenirs” (Di Lellio & Schwandner-
Sievers, 2006, p. 517). His sacrifice became an undisputed symbol of the Albanian 
struggle for national liberation. The meaning of the KLA war became as strong as to 
symbolically substitute almost completely the myth of the anti-fascist struggle of the 
partisans in WWII; many monuments that were built in Kosovo to commemorate dead 
soldiers are almost identical with monuments of socialism built in socialist Yugoslavia. 
Many of these representations, and especially those of Adem Jashari, represent 
“modernist aesthetic rooted in socialist memorial iconography” (Di Lellio & 
Schwandner-Sievers, 2006, p. 521). Indeed, a mushrooming of the monuments of the 
KLA soldiers and Albanian heroes as well as rituals, which “revolve around three 
fundamental constants: struggle, sacrifice, victory” (Ingmundarson, 2007, p. 104) can be 
witnessed today all around the country.  
However, a particular site symbolising both Albanian sacrifice and struggle for 
freedom stood out in post-war Kosovo – Prekaz.  The place where Jashari was killed was 
soon turned into a sacred space or territory by Albanian myth-making and “memory 
entrepreneurs” (Jelin cited in Di Lellio & Schwandner-Sievers, 2006, p. 514). In that 
place, in the village of Prekaz, a memorial complex ‘Adem Jashari’ was built and today is 
a “popular destination for an Albanian political tourism that has acquired the character of 
a pilgrimage” (Di Lellio & Schwandner-Sievers, 2006, p. 514). The myth of Jashari 
family and other Albanian national heroes represent a par excellence example of the 
territorialisation of memory. In this case, myth is the narrative of the sublime sacrifice 
and glories of war, which is being acted out by the rituals – political tourism and 
pilgrimage. In addition, the remaining members of the Jashari family are reserved a 
special moral status in Kosovar society. Their opinions often carry great weight in society 
and among political elites. All these are attempts to elevate the Jashari family to the level 
of a moral institution of Albanians. 
 
2.3.1. Between the lines: UNMIK’s agenda in Kosovo 
 
On 10 June 1999 Kosovo was placed under direct international (interim) administration, 
under the authority of the United Nations and its Resolution 1244. In terms of the 
legislation, the new UN-drafted legislation was informed by principles of multi-
culturalism and equality of all the ethnic, linguistic and religious groups in Kosovo - 
recognised under the category of ‘communities’ – the aim of which was to overcome past 
grievances and cleavages. This meant that for the first time in the 20
th
 century both 
Albanians and Serbs would be treated equally in terms of the constitutional category. As 
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regards citizenship, the UN created a separate civil register (Central Civil Register of 
Kosovo)
11
 for the residents of Kosovo, which in a way became a substitute for citizenship 
regulations, and issued UN Travel Documents to habitual residents in Kosovo. Hence, in 
certain aspects, the interim international administration in Kosovo, which was mandated 
to administer Kosovo until the final status settlement, set up the foundations of a new 
quasi citizenship regime, quite similar to the one that existed in the period between 1974 
and 1989 (Krasniqi, 2010, p. 8).   
UN administration was also involved in the post-war competition for symbols in 
Kosovo. Its campaign in post-war Kosovo of restoring the destroyed heritage had become 
a way of recreating the past that is able to promote a future of peaceful existence 
(Wolferstan, 2006, p. 105).  However, the international community’s mantra of ‘multi-
ethnicity’ never translated into a clearly defined vision of managing Kosovo’s post-war 
space. As argued by Blumi, UNMIK took a position of institutional management based 
on the rigid reconstructing of the political life in Kosovo along the lines of ethnic division 
between ‘Albanian’ and ‘Serb’ communities, which aimed at delegitimising all the pre-
existing structures as archaic symbols of a violent past (2003, p. 216). As a result, the 
pre-existing local social practices and common sites and spaces, including the ones 
originating from socialism, were abandoned. On the other hand, UNMIK and KFOR 
(which claimed exclusive responsibility for security in Kosovo, including the control of 
air space) attempted to establish legitimacy through their centralised control from 
Pristina, as well as through the use of billboards, media ads, UN ID cards etc.  
The exclusive approach of the international mission in Kosovo and its 
incompatibility with the desires and political ambitions of the majority of the population 
led to conflict and resistance from the local population. Territorial and symbolic 
modifications that were performed by Albanian individuals or local institutions were in 
line with the need to resist any attempts by UNMIK to “institutionalize its own 
reconstruction agenda [by defining Kosovo’s identity in terms of multi-ethnicity] by 
forgetting the past and by omitting the future status of Kosovo” (Ingmundarson, 2007, p. 
114). As observed by Wolferstan, “The existence of commemorative sites including 
statues […], monumental graves, a museum exhibition dedicated to KLA soldiers, posters 
of fleeing refugees marking [the anniversary of] the flight of Kosovo’s Albanians, anti-
UNMIK material culture and acts of resistance all betrayed the international community’s 
inability to bring the less savoury aspects of memory and its materiality out into the open 
for public debate” (Wolferstan, 2006, p. 106). 
When it comes to the Albanian resistance towards UNMIK’s multi-cultural 
vision, it is important to note that there is an inter-Albanian strife as well that plays an 
important role in the creation of the modern Kosovar Albanian identity.  According to 
Ingmundarson, the inter-Albanian strife is mainly a political power contest over 
memories of the struggle against Serbian rule in Kosovo between the non-violent legacy 
of the late President the dominant political party in the 1990s (the Democratic League of 
Kosovo - LDK) and the armed resistance of the disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army as 
represented, in the post-war period by two political parties – the Democratic Party of 
Kosovo (PDK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) (2007, p. 97). These 
two camps have appropriated figures of Ibrahim Rugova and Adem Jashari respectively 
and utilise them as symbols in their quest for political power in Kosovo. This struggle 
                                                 
11
 UNMIK/REG/2000/13. 
 14 
often seems to be suspended due to the daily political needs and party interests. Such 
were the 2004 government coalition between the LDK and AAK and the 2007 coalition 
between LDK and PDK. Compromises were made also at the time of negotiations on the 
final status of Kosovo when all parties were united in their positions on Kosovo’s future 
as an independent state.  
Therefore, after the war in Kosovo ended in 1999, Albanians had almost a total 
monopoly of symbolic life in the territory of Kosovo. The territorial and symbolic 
modifications that were made during this period were in line with the post-war liberation 
narrative (which was also filled with the myth of the national purity of the rural 
population) and the myth of the glorious war; they are symbolically represented through 
local heroic figures, above all Adem Jashari, as “the perfect embodiment of the ‘authentic 
Albanian patriot’ in opposition to the ‘putative Yugoslav corruption’ of the urban 
population” (Di Lellio & Schwandner-Sievers, 2006, p. 518). Streets, squares, buildings 
and even cities were renamed in an attempt to cleanse Kosovo’s territory of Serbian 
cultural elements. Notwithstanding these changes, the Ahtisaari Plan
12
 for the final status 
settlement in Kosovo, which constituted the basis for the declaration of independence of 
Kosovo, foresaw that all the cities should revert to the names by which they were known 
before the war. Therefore, it is a common practice in today’s Kosovo that streets, villages 
and cities have two or three different names, depending on who (Albanians, Serbs, or 
foreigners) uses them and in what context. 
 Hence, despite the adoption of non-discriminatory legislation that aimed at 
providing equality between various populations in Kosovo, UNMIK’s approach of seeing 
individuals through a reductionist, essentialist and ethnicising frame, failed to create a 
functional integrated territory and political space in Kosovo. The most visible dividing 
symbol is the bridge over river Ibër (Serbian Ibar) that divides the city of Mitrovica in a 
Serbian dominated north and Albanian dominated south. Serbian dominated areas in 
Kosovo, particularly northern Kosovo (where Russian president Vladimir Putin’s image – 
whose staunch opposition against Kosovo’s independence is deemed essential by the 
Serbs – decorates posters and billboards), represent ‘pieces of Serbia in Kosovo’ as 
everything is written in the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet and Serbian flags and inscriptions 
‘Republic of Serbia’ decorate the landscape. 
The logic of seeing various populations through their membership in homogenous 
ethnic groups, combined with the policies of creating new municipalities based on the 
principle of ethno-majoritarianism (Dahlam & Williams, 2010), facilitated the process of 
symbolic and special division, which eventually led to the creation of ethnically 
homogenous municipalities and areas.    
 
2.4. Citizenship struggles in ‘newborn’ Kosovo 
                                                 
12
 In 2005, the Security Council authorised the beginning of the status process, mediated by the former 
Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, in the capacity of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations for the future status process for Kosovo. With 15 rounds of negotiations organised, and 
with no compromise between leaders of Serbia and Kosovo on the horizon, on 26 March 2007, Ahtisaari 
presented his final version of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (known as the 
Ahtisaari Plan) to the Security Council and the Secretary General. It served as the legal and political basis 
for the declaration of independence of Kosovo and, according to the Constitution of Kosovo (art. 143.2), it 
shall take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo. See The Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement, 26 March 2007. http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html.  
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Having already endorsed the Ahtisaari Plan in March 2007, Kosovo declared 
independence on 17 February 2008. Kosovo was declared ‘to be a democratic, secular 
and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and protection 
under the law’ (Kosovo Declaration of Independence, 17 February 2008). According to 
Ahtisaari’s proposal, Kosovo should be a multi-ethnic society based upon the equality of 
all citizens and the highest level of internationally recognised human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, as well as the promotion and protection of the rights and 
contributions of all its communities and their members. The newly adopted legislation set 
up the contours of an all-inclusive citizenship, both at the micro and macro level. As far 
as citizenship, understood as a link between the individual and the state, is concerned, the 
boundaries of the new polity were to be established not according to the principle of 
origin, but according to territory (Krasniqi 2010: 10). 
 Nonetheless, in a situation where recognition of group rights seems to perpetuate 
group differences, the state of Kosovo lacks the necessary integrative ideology. Insistence 
on ‘multi-ethnicity’ and ‘multiculturalism’ in a society deeply divided on an ethnic basis 
and without a common link, risks rendering these concepts meaningless. As far as 
ordinary people are concerned in Kosovo, they seem to be divided based on ethno-
national belonging and pledge loyalty to their ethnic nations or their kin-states. They 
remain divided both physically (in the northern part of Kosovo), as well by mostly 
mutually exclusive symbols, which in turn have created various special boundaries 
between different communities. As a result, urban and public spaces have been used as 
arenas for new forms of exclusive political identities. In what follows, the paper looks in 
more detail at the symbolic changes that have taken place in the city of Pristina since 
1999 and the struggles for domination and appropriation of the public space. 
 
3. Post-war Pristina: demographic and symbolic changes 
 
For most of the 1990s, Serbian symbols and the Cyrillic script dominated Pristina. 
Despite the fact that more than 85 per cent – the exact percentage is not known since the 
last general census in Kosovo was in 1981 - of the population of the capital city was 
Albanian, the landscape was almost completely Serbian. However, a drastic change 
happened after 1999. Just as in other parts of the country, new Albanian inscriptions and 
symbols suddenly replaced the Serbian ones. Similar to the case of eradication of German 
symbolic culture in Poland after WWII, adopting the terminology used by Mach (1993, p. 
197), almost all symbolic aspects of Serbian culture were removed and the Albanian 
symbolic world was to (re)emerge; thus pre-existing emblems and inscriptions were 
removed from buildings and streets acquired new names which were supposed to indicate 
the Albanian character of the land and most of the Serbian monuments and memorials 
were removed and new Albanian ones were created to ‘remember’ a mythical past or the 
recent liberation war.  
In this way, what was previously JNA - Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija (YPA - 
Yugoslav People’s Army) street, became UÇK (KLA). The main street in Pristina  
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Fig. 3. UÇK (KLA) street     Fig. 4. Skënderbeu monument  
 
that before was called Marshal Tito street was renamed ‘Mother Teresa’ and a statue of 
her was built there with the intention of both promoting her Albanian origin and the pro-
Western orientation of Albanians. In the same street, two other Albanian national 
symbols have found a place; the first is a monument of the Albanian national hero from 
the Middle ages, Gjergj Kastrioti – Skënderbeu, which was built in front of the 
governmental building and opposite the national theatre; the second is a statue of one of 
the founders of the KLA – Zahir Pajaziti, erected opposite the once-famous five star hotel 
in Pristina, ‘Grand Hotel’, which in the 1990s was controlled by the notorious Serbian 
warlord, Željko Ražnatović - Arkan. Actually, the majority of the streets13 and 
monuments in Pristina today commemorate and glorify the liberation war of the KLA, as 
most of them carry names of warriors or other Albanian political and cultural figures. 
This Albanian post-war ‘master narrative’ also includes foreign politicians who were 
involved in the international intervention in Kosovo in 1999; a major street in the 
entrance of Pristina is named after the former U.S. President Bill Clinton; a statute of him 
was erected in 2009. The former President Bill Clinton – welcomed by thousands of 
Albanians who celebrate him as a hero for launching NATO's bombing campaign against 
Yugoslavia in 1999 that stopped the Serb forces' terror against ethnic Albanians - 
attended the unveiling of a 3.5-meter statue of himself on a key boulevard in Pristina that 
also bears his name (AP, 1 November 2009). Moreover, in December 2008 the 
Government of Kosovo decided to name a street in Pristina after the outgoing U.S. 
President, George W. Bush as a sign of appreciation for his commitment and support of 
Kosovo. 
 
                                                 
13
 Looking at the updated street index of Pristina, it turns out that out of almost 500 streets and squares, less 
than 10 of them carry the names of Serbian cultural and historical figures. See http://kk.rks-
gov.net/prishtina/getattachment/City-guide/Strrets-of-the-
city/lista_e_emertimeve_te_rrugeve_te_prishtines.pdf.aspx  
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Fig.5. Bill Clinton’s statue in Pristina  
 
Further, close to the unfinished Orthodox cathedral, in front of the Philology 
Faculty in Pristina where before was standing a statue of the famous Serbian philologist 
& language reformer of the 19
th
 century Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, today stands the statue 
of the academician Fehmi Agani, a distinguished Albanian sociologist and political 
activist from the 1990s, who was killed in 1999 by Serbian forces, in an wide-ranging 
campaign that targeted the Kosovar-Albanian political and cultural elite. Though no 
official decision has been taken yet with regard to the fate of the Orthodox cathedral in 
the university campus - there have been voices asking for it to be moved to another 
location since this area is intended for students, but due to its sensitivity, no decision has 
been taken yet.  
With regard to communism, one of the few monuments that survived until now is 
the ‘The Triangle’ that symbolised ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ in Kosovo, that stands in a 
square between the parliament building and Pristina’s City Hall. In the aftermath of the 
war there was an unsuccessful attempt (using dynamite) to destroy it. Nevertheless, the 
Municipality of Pristina recently announced that it plans to bring it down and build a new 
square dedicated to Adem Jashari.
 
While some people from the civil society in Pristina 
see this act as an attack on Pristina’s urban identity, the municipal officials have justified 
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the decision claiming that the monument does not represent any cultural, political or 
historical value for the city and its people (Koha Ditore, 16 August 2010). This is a clear 
tendency of the local authorities in Pristina to distance themselves both from the socialist 
past of the city and the Yugoslav and Serbian rule in Kosovo. 
 
 
Fig. 6: Triangle – the symbol of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ 
 
Therefore, both the number of Serb inhabitants (there are only few of them living 
in the city now) and their symbolic world that dominated Pristina prior to 1999 are 
drastically reduced. New Albanian symbols have been placed in the meantime all around 
the city. The architecture is much different today; the old grey communist apartment 
blocks in the centre of the city are painted and renovated and hundreds (mostly illegal) 
new modern style buildings have emerged. In the months after June 1999, most elements 
of the Serbian symbolic culture and in Kosovo were deliberately destroyed and a new 
Albanian-dominated landscape emerged, representing and commemorating people and 
events that signify Albanian nationalism and nationhood. Thus, the political activities of 
the emerging Albanian-dominated institutions in Kosovo brought about the emergence of 
the new ‘discursive landscape’ and produced the ‘symbolic fabric’ that linked the self-
understanding of Albanians with the territory of Pristina and Kosovo in general. So, a 
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more hybrid and socialist past was suppressed in order to create some kind of ethnic 
uniformity in post-war Kosovo.  
Although post-2008 Kosovo has put in place a civic and all-inclusive citizenship 
regime, the new country faces serious problems in the process of establishing its internal 
and external legitimacy and creating a political space accessible by all its citizens. As a 
result, territory, space, symbols and institutions remain contested, with Kosovar 
Albanian, Kosovar Serb and Serbian elites being engaged in a struggle for domination 
and control of the territory of Kosovo, its resources, people and landscape.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have shown how space and territory have been central to citizenship 
struggles in Kosovo. As a constitutive object of group struggle (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 
99), space has continuously been contested in Kosovo. As a result, the territory of 
Kosovo and its public space has experienced many phases of territorial modification and 
symbolic changes throughout the twentieth century, with changes always reflecting the 
balance of power. Street names, inscriptions, monuments as well as other markers and 
architecture to a certain extent, constitute those aspects of the landscape and geography 
that were permanently subject to modification and rearrangement. A physical 
(administrative or military) control over the country by one or the other nation also meant 
symbolic control of the territory and space. Continuing struggles over the socio-cultural 
and political boundaries delimiting the exercise of citizenship have resulted in segregated 
and mono-ethnic public spaces. In turn, this proves that inequalities in distribution of 
space and spatial capital can persist irrespective of the attempts to provide for central 
legal and political equality for different groups within a polity. 
 As a result, irrespective of the fact that at a political and legal level Kosovo has 
put in place an all-inclusive citizenship regime, the ‘newborn’ country remains both 
politically and symbolically divided. While Kosovo is still an unfinished and 
unconsolidated state where Serb and Kosovan jurisdictions and sovereignties overlap 
(Krasniqi, 2012), internal symbolic and spatial divisions persist and even widen. 
Although all the official inscriptions (streets, schools and other institutions) are written in 
Albanian, Serbian and English, still most of their names commemorate Albanian national 
history and people. On the other hand, in Serbian dominated areas, especially in the 
north, no Albanian or Kosovar symbol can be found. 
 To conclude, national groups, and above all, nationalist elites seek monopolies 
and control over the symbolic culture and geography, because “geographical indicators 
scan the physical space for evidence that supports a nation’s claim to a specific 
territory… [and because] … placing markers of national culture along the perimeters of a 
region make national boundaries appear real” (Herb, 1999, p. 22). And, undoubtedly, 
regions of overlapping historical claims such as Kosovo are the ideal battlefield of such a 
‘war for symbols’ where erection of symbolic boundaries and appropriation of public 
space by one group or the other threatens the very existence of democratic and all-
inclusive citizenship. 
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